consider an analogy to case law. When the decision of a majority of judges becomes authoritative in a case, their judgments are positioned to become authoritative for other courts hearing cases with similar facts. Thi s is the doctrine of precedent. Casui sts see moral authority similarly: social ethics develop from a soc ial consensus form ed around cases. This consensus is then extended to new cases by analogy to get the past cases around which the consensus was formed. The underlying consensus and the paradigm cases become enduring and authoritative sources of appeal. As a hi story of similar cases and similar judgments mount, more confidence is attached to those judgments. Eventually, a degree of moral certitude is found in the judgments, and the stable elements come together in the fom1 of tentative principles. As confidence in these generalizations increases, they are accepted less tentatively, and moral knowledge develops. Just as case law (legal rules) develops incrementally from legal decisions in cases, so the moral law (moral rules) develops incrementally.s Casuist ethici sts expend much thought on the degree of probability or certitude required for responsible moral judgment. They do not mean probability in the stati stical sense, but rather the likelihood of pelforming a morally right action in a specific case. In situations of profound moral importance they frequently require what they call the via tutior, the more safe course. In applying thi s rule to practical cases -particularly in medical bioethics -they insist almost unanimously that when a physician is in doubt about the efficacy of a treatment he must choose the safer course; even a remote possibility that a treatment would save a life makes that treatment mandatory.6 Today, many medical ethicists feel that a less stringent rule of moral probability can be safely followed than what has been inherited from the old casuists. 7 The renewal of casuistic thought in contemporary bioethics will be the subject of this paper.
Historical Considerations
Although its full-blown development came much later, the roots of casuistry are found in the ideas and practices of three earlier cultures: the ideas of Greek philosophy, the judicial practices of Roman law, and the traditions of rabbinical debate that developed within Judai sm. 8 Aristotle (384-322 BC) argued that a theoretical approach to ethics did not illuminate the practical problems of human conduct in specific cases and situations. He noted the idea of a "first principle" that is certain and inherently justified in science conceived on an axiomatic model. But, he also held that principles in ethics are deeply embedded in the concrete world of human social conduct. This idea was a significant starting point of the Greek philosophers' search for "philosophical foundation s" of ethics, and for "universal principles" in which the foundations might be expressed.
Culturally and socially, early Rome stood in marked contrast to fifth century BC Greece. They were a highly practical people with a strong sense of social hierarchy and respect for authority. As the Roman empire grew, the resulting proliferation of rules and laws led to significant changes in judicial practices. Two distinct groups of issues were functionally differentiated. On one side are issues that can be decided by applying general rules, or laws, according to the maxim, "like cases are to be decided alike." On the other side are iss ues that call for discretion or discernment, with an eye to particular features of each case, according to the maxim, "significantly different cases are to be decided differently." Tn this regard, Cicero (106-43 BC) bequeathed to history the first set of clearly formulated moral "cases." In hi s De Officiis are described a number of examples in which individuals are perplexed by a conflict of moral duty. This was the first "case book" that related a number of these dilemmas in order to analyze thei r moral logic .
Within Rabbinic Judaism , matters requiring moral discernment were resolved by discussion of earlier opinions and using them as "landmarks" from which to "triangulate" the way to resolution of the special problem. Historically, rabbinical debate was not only a precursor to Christian casuistry, but in fact, the two developed in parallel through the Middle Ages.
The roots of Christian casuistry are found within the New Testament itself. An often quoted example of incipient casuistry is found in Luke 20:21-22:9
They posed thi s question to him, "Teacher, we know that what you say and teach is correct, and you show no partiality, but teach the way of God in accordance with the truth. Is it lawful for us to pay tribute to Caesar or not?"
In the Pauline writings, examples of proto-casui stry include the resolution of issues such as eating sacrificial food (1 Cor 8:7-13) and the charism of virginity (l Cor 7:8-9 ; 25-28). 10 As Christianity spread throughout the world, it required Christian answers to the various questions of the day. Casuistry provided many of these solutions. These were preserved in the writings of the Church Fathers, and included topics as diverse as military service and proper dress for a Christian. Of particular importance were the writings of Tertullian (On Spectacles) and Augustine (On Lying). 1 1 Augustine'S two treatises on lying exemplify the casuistic form. He took up questions as to whether good intention excuses one from guilt, and whether it is wrong to tell a lie in jest or as a figure of speech. In his De Officiis, Ambrose addressed himself to the many "duties" of the believer. He sought to articulate these moral responsibilities in a concrete way that presaged the works of casuistry that would flouri sh 1,300 years later. As such, Ambrose has been called the first of the Christian casuists. J2 Up to thi s point, casuistry was more a general method rather than a formal ethical model. The Scholasti cs, and St. Thomas Aquinas in particul ar, pursued a different path, approaching moral theology in a more speculative and metaphysical fashion. I} Casuistry became a central element in the life of Roman Catholici sm with the requirement of auricular confession by the Fourth Lateran Council in 12 I 5 . '~ The study of cases was motivated, in paJ1, to facilitate the training of confessors in the application of the norms of the Decalogue to the "times, places, and person ." 15 Thi s led to the development of specific courses in , and manuals of, "cases of conscience" to train clerics charged with the pastoral duty of hearing confessions. ' 6 Within the Protestant tradition , the Cambridge Puritan preacher William Perkins (1558-1602) presented the first sustained treatment of casui stry in the English language in hi s The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience. 17 A significant turning point came in the mid-seventeenth century -a time of great religious controversy throughout the Christian world. In particular, Blai se Pascal in hi s Provincial Letters (1656-1657) set out a vitrioli c attack on the practice of casui stry in the Roman Catholic Church and its principal practitioners, the Jes uits. The heart of Pascal's criticism of Jesuit cas ui stry was its laxness and hypocrisy. According to Pascal: " ... the license which they have assumed to tamper with the most ho ly rules of Christian conduct amounts to a total sub version of the law of God. "
The casuists were hypocrites in that they pretended to be, in the midst of their laxness, something they were not -faithful Christians.
Pascal's attack on casuistry had devastating effects on the practice as a form of moral reasoning. The term itself came to mean an unfaithful application of principles. Over time, casuistry, as a model of moral reasoning, fell out of favor except in a few particular circles within Roman Catholici sm, Judaism, and some denominations of Protestanti sm. 18 To this day, Roget's Thesaurus lists the following synonyms, among others, for casuistry: equivocation, mystification, word-fencing, hair-splitting, claptrap, mumbo-jumbo, empty-talk, quibbling, chicanery, subterfuge, and cop-out.
Notwithstanding the above, St. Alphonsus Li guori's ( L696-1787) more balanced approach reestablished the usefulness of the method. He developed a principle in casuistry known as equi-probabilism, whereby a person could avoid the seeming obligation of a law only on condition that the contrary position was at least as probable. With such modifications, the casuistric approach has characterized Catholic moral theology, to some degree, until the Second Vatican Council. 19 In the last thirty years with the emergence of the field of secular bioethics and the prominence of concrete moral dilemmas and controversies in moral philosophy, the theoretical models have proven to be inept in resolving such controversies and dilemmas in a secular world. One response to the particular dilemmas of medicine has been the attempt to develop a casuistry for bioethics. 20 
Casuistry on Contemporary Bioethics
Bioethics, following the history of modern moral philosophy, has made use of different moral theories to resolve bioethical disputes. 21 One conceptual difficulty in the use of moral theory is the difficulty of justifying the basis of one theory over and against other approaches such as utilitariani sm and deontology. 22 A second conceptual issue is that any theory requires a particular moral commjtment or set of moral values in order to reach solutions to the dilemma. 23 Moral theorists have become mired in disputes about both the foundations and values which should be used in developing a moral theory.
In the absence of a unified moral theory for resolving dilemmas in applied ethics a number of strategies have emerged to meet the challenges of moral pluralism. One of the strategies which seeks to avoid the dilemmas of moral theory is the effort to revive the practice of casuistry. 24 In spite of casui stry 's tarnished reputation, some philosophers have claimed that casui stry, stripped of its unfortunate excesses, has much to teach us about the resolution of moral problems in medicine. 25 This "new casuistry" could appropriately be viewed, not so much as a rival to the applied ethics model, but rather as a necessary complement to any and all moral theories that would guide our conduct in specific situations. 26 In contrast to methods that begin from "on high" with the working out of a moral theory and culminate in the deductive application of norms to particular situations, this new casuistry works from the "bottom up", emphasizing practical problem solving by means of nuanced interpretation of individual cases Y Instead of focusing on the need to fit principles to cases, thi s interpretation stresses the particular nature, derivations, and function of the principles manipulated by the new casuists. Through this alternative theory of principles, we begin to di scern a morality that develops, not from the top down as in most interpretations of Roman law, but rather from case to case (or from the bottom up) as in the common law. What differenti ates the new casuistry from applied ethics, then, is not the February, 2003 mere recognition that principles must eventually be applied, but rather a particular account of the logic and derivation of the principles that we use in moral di scourse. 28 Thus, in the practice of casuistry, properly understood, a comprehensive ethical theory does not precede, but follows the study of particular cases -though it is surely true that moral problems are construed around "an already perceived but, as yet, inarticulate moral notion" exemplified by particular cases. 29 Thi s focus suggests that casuistry and clinical ethics consultation are very much the same -both are forms of reasoning directed toward practical resolutions that lead to decisions and to practical actions.
Consider how the casui st mi ght approach the case of the father's refusal to become a donor. The casui st would begi n by identifying particular features in the case rather than appealing to uni versal principles, utilitarian calculations, or tights. The casuist would then attempt to identify the relevant precedents and prior experiences with other cases, attempting to determine how similar and different thi s case is from experiences with other cases. In assessi ng what the father should do, the casuist would determine whether we typically insist, in relevantly similar cases, that parents bear comparable inconvenience and risk to offer their children some chance of survi val. In determining what the physician should do, analogous cases would be considered in which breaches of confidentiality are justified or unjustified. The objective is to act in light of any strong social consensus found in precedent cases in medicine and law. Such cases would indicate, for example, that physicians have a right and sometimes an obligation to breach confidentiality in order to prevent harm to others. Examples of these cases include reporting gunshot wounds and venereal di seases, and in some contexts, warning intended victims of a patient's threatened violence.
The casuist might also ask whether the father 's refusal to donate would cause a harm to hi s daughter or would only fail to benefit her and whether a threatened or actual breach of confidentiality might be justified in an effort to force him to donate. Similarly the casuist would ask whether a lie ("the father is not hi stocompatible") or a milder form of deception ("for medical reasons the father should not donate") could be justified to prevent wrecking the family. The casuist would attempt to answer these questions by appeal to maxims grounded in experience and tradition, as well as by reasoning from analogous cases.
Conclusion
Today's casuists have reminded us of the importance of analogical reasoning, paradigm cases, and practical judgment. Biomedical ethics, like ethical theory, may have undul y minimized thi s approach to moral knowledge. Casui sts have also rightly pointed out that generalizations are often best learned, accommodated, and implemented by using cases, case discussion, and case methods. These insights can be utili zed by connecting them to an appropriate set of concepts, principles, and theories th at control the selection and analysis of cases. Biomedical ethics has long been driven by two kinds of analysis: case study and ethical theory. Cases such as Quinlan, Bouvia, and Baby M are discussed across the literature of the field , form a shared resource, and become integral to the way we think and draw conclusions. They profoundly influence our standards of fairness, negligence, paternalism, and the like. A proper account of moral judgment is critical for biomedical ethics, which cannot flouri sh without a link between theory, principles, and decision-making. Se nsitivity to context and individual differences is essential for a di scerning use of principles. Casui stry is notable for no other reason than its long hi story of attempting to deal with thi s proble m. 3D
Finally casuistry, as a formal ethical model -and within its hi storic context, developed within a culture where there was a consensus on celtain moral va lues and principles (the Decalogue and the teachings of Christ, as an example). Within Catholic moral theology, casuistry functioned within the contex t of a common belief in God, the destiny of humankind, the acceptance of the principles of double effect, of totality, and the theory of probabili sm. 31 Unfortunately, in contemporary applied ethics, such as hospital ethics committees, there is rarel y a consensus on principles. This appears to be true even among groups that one might believe to be alike in their be li efs, such as Roman Catholicism, or even Chri stianity in general. The greatest wea kness of cas ui stry in contemporary bioethics would appear to be the very nature of our plurali stic society with its lack of universall y accepted values and principles. This, of course, is made worse by the ever-widening rift between religious and secular society.
Casuistry, it would appear, may function well as a method of case analysis, but there is legitimate concern as to whether it can be a reliable theory of bioethics in practice.
